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taic report Communication breakdown causes Hanjin grounding The Hanjin Bombay a bulk carrier owned by Kamco No.4 Shipping Company S.A. of Panama and operated by Hanjin Shipping Company Limited ran aground on the Mount Maunganui side of the entrance channel. Built in 1994/1995 Hanjin Bombay has an overall length of 167m and a breadth of 26.2m. It had a summer draft (fully loaded) of 9.88m, giving a total displacement of 35,509.9 tonnes. At the time of the accident the mean draft was 9.86m and the vessel was carrying about 26,268 tonnes of logs. Powered by a single B&W 5L50MC/HHIC directreversing diesel engine developing 7450 brake-horsepower (5555kW), driving a single fixed-pitch propeller and giving a loaded service speed of 14.14 knots, Hanjin Bombay had a semi-balanced rudder fitted directly behind the propeller. The vessel was not fitted with a bow thruster and had the typical suite of navigational equipment. A malfunctioning three-way valve was held to be the cause of the engine-cooling failure that led to the grounding, but post-accident investigation was unable to discover the cause of the malfunction. A t about 1930 on 21 June 2010, Hanjin Bombay left the wharf at Mount Maunganui with 20 crew members and loaded with a full cargo of logs bound for the port of Kunsan in Korea. The vessel was under the control of a Port of Tauranga harbour pilot with the master in command. The vessel was manoeuvred off the berth and turned in the channel using the main engine and two tugs. Once the vessel was heading outward the vessel's main engine was used to propel it seaward. The two tugs remained with the ship until it was about to enter the narrow entrance channel, at which point they were released to return to their berth, but remained in radio contact with the pilot. As the Hanjin Bombay began to increase speed, a malfunctioning valve in the engine cooling system caused the engine cooling water to rise above normal temperature. The engine room crew did not alert the bridge to the problem, but instead began attempting to resolve the cooling-water issue. Oblivious to the technical problem, the bridge team took the Hanjin Bombay into the narrow entrance channel and continued 80 Professional Skipper September/October 2013 to increase the engine speed to improve the steering performance. The engine-cooling-water temperature continued to rise and reached the point where the engine safety control system automatically slowed the engine, then shut it down completely to prevent it becoming permanently damaged. The main engine on the Hanjin Bombay could be controlled either directly from the side of the main engine or electropneumatically from the control room or navigating bridge. The main engine side control would usually only be used if the other systems failed, and the main engine could only be controlled from one of the control systems at a time. This was usually the bridge when the vessel was being manoeuvred under pilotage. The direction and speed of the main engine were controlled from the navigating bridge by a single telegraph transmitter with reversing, starting, stopping and speed regulation controlled through a micro-computer unit. The equipment also incorporated safety devices including an engine safety system and a manual emergency shut down system using electro-pneumatic signals. The engine safety system would automatically slow down the main engine (for 10 instances) and, if the fault was not corrected, shut down the main engine (for five instances). The automatic slow down could be overridden for all 10 instances and for four of the five shut down instances. This was done by pushing a button on either the control room panel or the navigating bridge panel. An automatic engine slow down or shut down due to high cooling-water temperature was one of the instances that could be overridden. The engine safety system was designed to protect the engine from damage. The override feature was provided in case the automatic slowdown or loss of an engine was going to result in more serious damage and compromise the safety of the vessel and crew. The chief engineer said later that the settings had been set by the manufacturer to the company-recommended settings and that he had not altered them since he had been on board the vessel. The Hanjin Bombay was negotiating the turn from the Cutter Channel into No.2 Reach when the engine shut down. The loss of propulsion reduced the steering performance of the vessel and the rudder was unable to arrest the turn before the ship left the channel and grounded on the eastern shore of the channel. The harbour pilot had radioed the tugs to return to the Hanjin Bombay, but they arrived at the vessel just after it had grounded. The Hanjin Bombay remained aground for about two hours until it refloated on a rising tide. The vessel received a hole in one of its water-ballast tanks www.skipper.co.nz