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TRANSPORT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION COMMISSION ACT 1990 The principal purpose of the Transport Accident Investigation Commission shall be to determine the circumstances and causes of accidents and incidents, with a view to avoiding similar occurrences in the future, rather than to ascribe blame to any person. FAULTY VALVES SET OFF ENGINEROOM CO2 SYSTEM The Marsol Pride L ate on May 23, 2010, a valve on the No. 1 carbon dioxide (CO2 ) pilot cylinder on board the Marsol Pride developed a leak and charged the engineroom's fixed fire-smothering system ready for release. Had the rest of the system been intact, that should have been as far as this incident went, the Transport Accident Investigation Commission said in its report. But a second leak in the booster valve allowed gas to pass and activate the "gang release" mechanism and open the main control valve. This activated the entire system and CO2 flooded the engineroom. gas gas fire smothering system is a serious event, because the gas displaces any air in the space so it cannot sustain human life and it can immobilise the ship's propulsion and generator systems at a critical part of an operation," the TAIC said. The Marsol Pride had been conducting underwater operations within the Tui oil and gas field off the western coast of the North Island. She was operating in the vicinity of the Umaroa floating unit and had 33 technicians and crew on board. The Marsol Pride's third engineer was on duty in the engineroom. As he entered the engine control room at about 2320 the CO2 warn CO2 The incident caused one of the two main propulsion engines of the 60m offshore support vessel to shut down due to air starvation, but there was no damage and no-one was injured. "An uncontrolled or inadvertent activation of an engineroom fixed CO2 alarm sounded and the warning light flashed to was about to be released into the engineroom. He left the engineroom and radioed the night master to say the alarm had gone off. The chief engineer arrived and retrieved the key to the CO2 the pressure gauge for the CO2 room. When they entered the room they noticed manifold was registering about 30 bar, or 3MP. They also found the discharge hose on the No. 1 pilot cylinder was covered with condensation and frost. The chief engineer opened the air/shore valve to vent the gas in the manifold and reduce the pressure on the hose line. This worked initially but the gas iced up and blocked the valve and the manifold pressure began to rise again. The chief engineer then decided to disconnect the No. 1 pilot cylinder from the system and the pair went to get the correct tools. When they returned they heard the system firing and releasing the main charge of CO2 into the engineroom. The alarm had shut down the fans supplying air to the engineroom and the combined effect caused the port engine to stop, but the starboard engine and three gensets continued to run. The fire alarm sounded at about this time and the master went to the bridge, took back control of the ship and manoeuvred the Marsol Pride away from the Umaroa. At about 2356 the chief and second engineer entered the engineroom wearing self-contained breathing apparatus. They found no fire and restarted the fans and the port engine. By about 0024 the master had control of both engines and returned to the port of New Plymouth at about 0810. The fire-smothering system on board the ship comprised 20 45 kilo cylinders of CO2 gas, all connected to a common manifold, of which two were the pilot cylinders. Inside the cabinet were two handles. One opened the pilot cylinder valves and gas filled and pressurised the CO2 manifold. The second handle opened the boost valve, which used the pressure in the manifold to activate the other cylinders, and CO2 gas from those cylinders opened the pressure manifold. Thirty seconds later, CO2 After the vessel had berthed, the chief engineer noted the November/December 2011 Professional Skipper 71 pressure from the manifold opened the main valve and gas entered the engineroom through branch lines and nozzles. The system had been checked eight days before the incident.