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TAIC CONTINUED … some speed on she climbed the front and fell into the trough, this time landing to starboard. The force broke the casting holding the navigator's seat to the floor and broke the skipper's ankle. The helmsman reduced speed and regained control. A crew member contacted CNR and by about 2124 they were across the South Channel and in the harbour entrance. The helmsman then drove to Onehunga, where the injured skipper was transferred to an ambulance at the Old Mangere Bridge slip before returning to French Bay. The Commission also mentioned two other Coastguard occurrences in its report. It did not investigate either, but Coastguard NZ provided their report on the incidents. On August 31, 2009, seven members of Coastguard Riverton departed on the Russell John Chisholm at about 1905 for a heavy- weather training session with the skipper at the helm. After crossing the bar, they plotted a course to clear rough inshore water off Howells Point. As the 8m Naiad rigid inflatable approached Pig Rocks, off Pig Island, the skipper slowed to about 21 knots to pass over a couple of 2m waves. He then encountered a third wave which flung the boat's stern upwards and she fell heavily to starboard. Three crew required hospital treatment for moderate injuries. A crew member who escaped injury administered first aid, radioed Coastguard Riverton and drove the boat back to base, where an ambulance was waiting to attend to the injured. In the second occurrence, Coastguard Hibiscus received a call from CNR at about 2146 on March 6, 2010 to attend a vessel taking on water off Tiri Tiri Matangi Island. The Hibiscus Rescue One, an 8.5m Rayglass Protector, left her base at the Gulf Harbour Marina at about 2155 with five crew on board. The navigator was entering the GPS coordinates for the incident vessel. The radar and charts were not displayed on her screen. At the same time, the skipper was adjusting the helmsman's display screen to obtain a radar image. As the vessel transited the marina at about 2201, another crew member tried unsuccessfully to log a trip report via UHF, so she called CNR on the VHF radio and was advised to stand by. At this time the skipper was able to obtain a radar image on the helmsman's screen. As they cleared the marina breakwater, the navigator told the skipper she had entered the GPS coordinates of the incident vessel. Her radar screen was showing land to port but no radar echoes ahead. She advised the skipper to "move to starboard a bit". The skipper adjusted the throttle and sped up to over 26 knots. At about 2202 the Hibiscus Rescue One shuddered and skidded as it hit rocks off Rakauanganga Point, spun about 180 degrees, throwing the engines off their pivots and shutting them down. The skipper was thrown from the helmstation but nobody on board was injured and they returned to the marina. The hull's engine skegs, cowling and hydraulics were damaged and the hull was scraped. "The four accidents … represented only 0.11 percent of all Coastguard New Zealand callouts, based on the average from July 2008 to June 2010. To put any issue into perspective, that represents a high proportion of successful missions," said the Commission. "These four accidents did, however, result in serious injury to some Coastguard crew members and some serious damage to the vessels and equipment." In analysing the incidents, the TAIC said in three cases the person in charge was influenced by a desire to task a unit beyond what was actually required. For instance, the skipper of the Trusts Rescue was convinced against his better judgement to cross the Manukau bar in the dark and to use the South West Channel, not the South Channel, to suit the preferences of the Earthrace. The Coastguard was also providing what was in effect a pilotage service. Operators of small vessels, including Coastguard, often rely on electronic navigation suites to help maintain spatial awareness. Radar gives the crew an actual picture of their position in relation 74 Professional Skipper September/October 2011 to above-water objects, but radar screens in small vessels in rough seas will often show what is called "sea clutter", the problem encountered by the Dive! Tutukaka Rescue crew. Crews also need to be aware of underwater dangers. All four crews used GPS-referenced chartplotters as a navigation aid, but they can be inaccurate close to the shore and other structures. If the sea conditions are rough, the vessel's response time should not be calculated using her normal cruising speed. "If a more suitable vessel is available, consideration should be given to using that vessel instead." The Commission said rigid inflatable boats might not be the most suitable type of craft for night operations in heavy seas. Vessels were purchased based on what individual Coastguard units thought best suited their needs. "Using this approach, Coastguard NZ had missed the opportunity to standardise the vessels and the onboard equipment (which would help with standardised training) and had also missed the opportunity to optimise the structure of the fleet. One or more of the nine Coastguard units operating in the Hauraki Gulf might be better to use a larger, slower, displacement-type vessel more suited to heavy-weather night-time operations. "As this enquiry progressed, changes within Coastguard NZ were starting to address this issue." The Commission also drew attention in the report to the use of Coastguard craft for extra-curricular or commercial activities, and of carrying passengers on board. Planning was a fundamental requirement for the success of search and rescue operations, and the sense of urgency surrounding Coastguard work could adversely affect decision-making. "Every one of the crew should know what the plan is and the vessel prepared as much as practicable before departure. An open-ended plan using the Coastguard's 'Stop, assess and plan' procedure could be modified if more or new information became known." Teamwork, or crew resource management, helped eliminate the potential for one-person errors. CRM was part of the advanced skipper's course, but should feature at the beginning of all Coastguard NZ training, the Commission said. It also said there could be a disparity in some units between the operating limits for the vessel and its designation as a non- passenger vessel, and the qualifications of the skipper, which would require changes to bring the operation in line with Maritime Rules. On May 13, the Royal New Zealand Coastguard Inc. said it accepted all six recommendations the Commission made in the report. It will: • implement a national standard that supports measured decisions based on the maximum available information when tasking Coastguard assets • introduce a high standard of navigation skills in volunteer training • standardise pre-departure planning, including a risk assessment • encourage individuals to appreciate personal and team responsibility • align training requirements with Maritime New Zealand commercial qualifications, and • identify funding to undertake the Vessel Standardisation Project, as identified in the Coastguard's 2020 Vision document. This will include building the rescue vessel fleet to agreed plans and processes, and devising a standard fit-out to an agreed national standard. On May 17, the Director of Maritime Safety advised that the Coastguard supported the proposed Qualifications and Operational Limits framework. Skippers may hold either an ILM or LLO certificate of competency. Vessel crews also undertake training beyond Maritime NZ standards "to recognise the conditions in which they operate."