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DARK CLOUDS OF WAR LOOMING OVER STRAIT OF HORMUZ BY MURRAY DEAR Strait of Hormuz was known as the ���Silkworm Envelope��� as Iranian Silkworm ASMs were considered to be a major threat to shipping. In July 2006, Iranian supplied Noor ASMs fired by Hizbollah badly damaged an Israeli corvette and sank a merchant ship off the coast of Lebanon. The US Navy currently operates only fourteen mine countermeasures vessels plus a few littoral combat ships which can be fitted with mine warfare mission packages. The clearance of mines by US Navy Sea Dragon helicopters would not be a viable option while the Strait of Hormuz was covered by SAM batteries. In short the US Navy has a mine clearance capability gap which would need to be filled by mine warfare vessels from American allies and friends. It was the Royal Navy which led the mine clearance operation off Kuwait during the 1991 Gulf War. Mine clearance vessels operating in the Strait of Hormuz would need to be protected by surface escorts together with air cover provided from US carrier groups stationed in the Gulf of Oman. There can be little doubt that as fast as minefields were cleared, Iran would try to lay more mines in the shipping lanes and the US Navy would equally try to sink these minelayers. Clearing minefields dominated by a hostile shore is not an easy task. Three battleships were sunk by mines in the ill-fated Anglo-French attempt to force the Dardanelles in March 1915 prior to the debacle now known as the ANZAC assault, on the Gallipoli Peninsula. While the clearance of any minefields laid in the Strait of Hormuz would not be impossible, it is likely to be quite difficult. Closure of the Strait of Hormuz would result in a substantial rise in the price of oil, which would increase commensurately as the disruption to tanker movements intensified. Any extended closure of the Strait of Hormuz may well result in oil peaking at over US$200 a barrel. Such an increase would inevitably result in petrol locally costing up to $4 a litre at the pump. This could well be the trigger to tip the New Zealand economy back into recession. It is to be hoped that current diplomatic efforts prevail regarding Iran���s nuclear ambitions. Winston Churchill���s dictum that ���Jaw-jaw is better than war-war��� should be a paramount consideration. Murray Dear is a retired banker and naval historian with a particular interest in mine warfare. VIP.S84 I t appears increasingly likely that Israel may unilaterally attack Iran���s nuclear facilities in the northern spring or summer. This attack is likely to be similar to Israel���s bombing of Iraq���s Osirak nuclear reactor in June 1981 and a probable nuclear facility under construction in northern Syria in 2007. Such an attack could well trigger a large and devastating regional war encompassing nations from Israel in the west to Afghanistan in the east. Iran���s response is likely to include ballistic missiles targeted at Israel and possibly US naval and military bases in the region. Iran would also very likely encourage Hizbollah and Hamas to attack Israel from Lebanon and Gaza respectively. A focal point which may well decide the outcome of such a regional conflict is the Strait of Hormuz, which Iran has threatened to block if attacked. This strategic waterway through which passes around 20 percent of the world���s seaborne oil movements, connects the Persian Gulf with the Arabian Sea. The Iranian naval base of Bandar Abbas is strategically situated on the northern coast of the Strait of Hormuz. Iran is very well aware that the US Navy is particularly vulnerable to mine warfare. While the US Navy has not suffered a war loss since four vessels were sunk by mines during the Korean War, Iranian and Iraqi mines were responsible for three of the five US warships that were seriously damaged in the region during the past 25 years. It was the mining of the frigate Samuel B Roberts in April 1988 that lead to one of the largest naval battles since World War II with the sinking of an Iranian frigate and a fast attack craft. Another Iranian frigate was seriously damaged. During the 1991 Gulf War, the cruiser Princeton and the amphibious assault ship Tripoli were badly damaged by Iraqi mines. If Iran decided to block the Strait of Hormuz to all but its own flagged shipping, it has a number of surface vessels and submarines capable of laying moored contact mines which have a pedigree dating back to the pre-dreadnought battleship era, as well as more sophisticated influence mines. These minefields would likely be protected by fast attack craft and small coastal submarines operating from Bandar Abbas plus land based anti ship missile (ASM) and surface to air missile (SAM) batteries. During the 1987-88 tanker war between Iran and America, the January/February 2013 Professional Skipper 65